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Abstract 
 
In this article, we study the impact of temporary employment (TE) on productivity and, in 
particular, we wonder if it differs according to sectors skill intensity. Our data set is an ad-hoc 
industry-level panel of European countries, which allows to deal with endogeneity problems. 
Our main result is that TE has a negative impact on productivity, but it is more damaging in 
skilled sectors. While an increase of 10 percentage points of the share of TE in skilled sectors 
decrease labour productivity growth about 1-1.5%, in unskilled sectors the decrease would be 
0.5-0.8%. This result is robust to changes in the skill intensity index and in the sample 
composition. We also discuss policy implications of this result for labour market regulation.  
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1. Introduction 
Following the widespread diffusion of temporary contracts in the last two decades, a large 
concern has been growing about direct and side negative effects of increasing flexibility of 
labour markets. To this extent, the evaluation of the impact of temporary employment (TE) on 
labour productivity is especially significant because from a theoretical point of view it is not 
obvious what would be the effect of TE on labour productivity. On the one hand, it would seem 
rationale for a temporary worker to exert a greater effort in order to get the renewal of the 
contract and/or the passage to a more stable form of job (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). 
However, in a context where the expected probability of the renewal is low, this argument 
might not be valid (Dolado et al., 2012). On the contrary, given the temporary, and frequently 
short, duration of contracts it might be rationale for a firm to fix a lower reservation 
productivity under which to layoff temporary workers than permanent ones (PE), in order to 
avoid the direct and indirect firing costs (Lisi, 2012). Moreover, TE is disproportionally filled 
by younger, less educated and less experienced workers, and temporary workers often have less 
access to training programmes (OECD, 2002, 2007a, Bassanini et al. 2007). From an empirical 
perspective, early literature did not found any significant impact of TE on labour productivity 
(Bassanini and Venn, 2007, 2008, Bassanini et al., 2009, Cingano et al., 2010). However, more 
recent studies with different empirical strategies find a negative and significant impact of TE on 
productivity (e.g., Cappellari et al., 2012, Dolado et al., 2012, Lisi, 2013). 
The main objective of this research consists of estimating the impact of the share of temporary 
employment on productivity, explicitly considering the differential effect in skilled and 
unskilled economic sectors. We go beyond the current literature arguing that there are good 
reasons to suspect that the impact of TE might differs significantly according to sectors skill 
intensity. From a theoretical perspective, this impact might be either positive or negative. On 
the one hand, in skilled sectors the use of TE might be more oriented towards screening new 
workers respect to unskilled ones, which could induce a higher effort and, in turn, a higher 
labour productivity (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005, Dolado et al., 2012). On the other hand, if 
TE is used in the labour market as a structural cheaper form of job (Houseman, 2001), in 
skilled sectors the cost in terms of lower workers’ effort could be heavier, leading to an even 
greater reduction in labour productivity (Lisi, 2012)
1
. 
                                                          
1 In particular, in that paper it is shown that, as long as temporary worker perceives a sufficiently low conditional probability of 
getting the renewal of the contract and/or the passage to a stable job, there might be a scope for exerting an effort level just in 
line with the firm reservation productivity, which indeed for temporary workers should not be especially high. From this 
perspective, the use of temporary contracts might induce a reduction in labour productivity. 
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The empirical analysis is performed on an industry-level panel of EU countries, which allows 
us to divide sectors between skilled and unskilled. Borrowing from the skill-biased 
technological change literature, we consider (un)skilled those sectors with a ratio between 
skilled and unskilled workers (lower) higher than the average (see e.g., Bond and Van Reenen, 
2007). To test the robustness of our results, we compute different indexes of sectors skill 
intensity, using different definitions of skilled workers. Moreover, the industry-level panel 
allows us to control for different specific unobserved fixed effects, which should attenuate the 
omitted variable bias. 
Differently from previous articles using the EPL index for TE, as discussed in Lisi (2013) we 
use directly the variation in the share of TE. The empirical specification exploits both cross-
country and time variation in the share TE and, in particular, the exogenous variation in the 
impact of TE among different industries. Finally, to the extent that the share of TE might be 
endogenous in the productivity equation, we perform also an IV-strategy to test further the 
identification. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study trying to investigate the impact of TE 
differentiated according to sectors skill intensity. Apart from offering a more accurate 
description, the investigation of such differential effect should represent a valid contribution to 
the previous literature on TE, suggesting how temporary contracts are currently used in the 
labour market (that is, least-cost way of screening new workers or cheaper form of job).  
Our main result is that TE is even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative effect 
significantly heavier than in unskilled sectors, and this would seem robust to little changes in 
the skill intensity index and in the sample used. In particular, an increase of 10 percentage 
points of the share of TE in skilled sectors would lead to a decrease of about 1–1.5% in labour 
productivity growth, whereas in unskilled ones the reduction would be only of 0.5–0.8%. In 
addition, statistical tests on the difference of the impact of TE between labour productivity and 
total factor productivity do not reject the hypothesis of equality, implying that TE affects labour 
productivity mainly reducing total factor productivity. Therefore, a higher share of TE is more 
harmful in those sectors where production uses skills more intensively. To some extent, this 
result might support the idea that TE is currently used more as a cheaper form of job, instead of 
as a least-cost way of screening new workers (see e.g., Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). Indeed, 
this result could have very important policy implications for labour market regulation. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we describe the characteristics of our dataset and 
main variables. Then, Section 3 presents the strategy we pursue to identify the differential 
impact of TE across sectors and, in particular, the method we use to divide sectors. In Section 4 
we show the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and 
discusses some policy implications. 
 
2. Data and variables 
We use an industry-level panel of EU countries. As emphasized by the previous literature, the 
advantage of using a panel of industry-level data is fourfold. First, not only the cross-country 
variation is still exploited, but also the variation on the impact of policies in different industries. 
Second, in contrast to the cross-country analysis, it potentially allows to control for unobserved 
fixed effects. Third, as the previous literature emphasised (e.g. OECD, 2007b), the within-
industry “composition effect” appears to be negligible, allowing us to identify the “independent 
effect” of EPL for PE and TE2. Fourth, to the extent that events in a single industry are not so 
relevant alone to affect the policy in a country, the specification is less subject to the 
simultaneity problem between the variable of interest and policy. 
To some extent, a micro-level panel with establishment or linked employer-employee data 
might offer a research design even more appealing to evaluate the impact of some labour 
market policies as temporary contracts. However, such datasets are usually bounded to a 
specific country
3
. Therefore, in the perspective to offer a reliable evaluation for the European 
context as a whole, the choice of the industry-level panel should represent a good compromise 
between the internal and external validity of the causal inference. 
In particular, the dataset covers 10 sectors in 13 countries over the years 1992-2007, for a 
balanced panel of 2080 observations. Countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. Since we make use of different data sources, we did some aggregation and 
                                                          
2 In the literature the impact of a labour market policy on productivity is usually divided into “composition effect” and 
“independent effect”. The first is the effect on productivity associated with the change in the composition of employment due 
to the policy variation (for instance, an increase in the share of unskilled workers). The second is the pure average effect of the 
policy on productivity (that is, ceteris paribus) and, thus, it is often the effect of interest. In this regard, different previous 
studies emphasize that “composition effects” are somewhat relevant in the aggregate analysis and, indeed, they cannot be easily 
dismissed. Therefore, any aggregate analysis of the impact of some labour market policies on productivity hardly will be able 
to isolate the “independent effect” of the policy and, in turn, to produce a useful contribution for policy guidance. Differently, 
industry-level analyses suggest that the within-industry “composition effects” are fairly negligible (OECD, 2007b) and, 
therefore, the use of industry-level panel data should succeed in identifying the “independent effect” of the policy.  
3 For instance, WHIP for Italy, LIAB for Germany, EPA for Spain, BHPS for the United Kingdom. 
5 
 
the final sectors classification is based on the standard EUROSTAT classification (see Annex 3 
for details). The sectors are the following: “Agriculture, hunting and forestry”, 
“Manufacturing”, “Electricity, gas and water supply”, “Construction”, “Wholesale and retail 
trade”, “Hotels and restaurants”, “Transport, storage and communication”, “Financial 
intermediation”, “Real estate, renting and business activities”, “Other community, social, 
personal service activities”. With this sectors classification, we will define two aggregate 
groups by skill intensity consisting of five sectors with enough variability for identification. 
To collect our dataset we made use of different sources. The data on labour productivity, total 
factor productivity and employment level at the industry-level were collected from EU KLEMS 
dataset (www.euklems.net). This comprehensive database contains data on economic growth, 
productivity, employment and other variables at the industry-level for all EU countries, 
providing an important data-source for policy evaluation. Moreover, productivity measures are 
developed with growth accounting techniques, coherently with our empirical specification. 
The labour productivity measure used is the “gross value added per hour worked, volume 
indices, 1995 = 100”, defined in the following way: 
       
         
            
                                                                                                                (1) 
where VA is the gross value added in volumes and L is the total amount of hours worked (see 
Annex 2 for details). Looking at the behaviour of our variable over time, the mean of labour 
productivity in the entire sample is 110.94, whereas the mean from 1995 (base year = 100) is 
114.31, telling us that labour productivity grew in EU countries, even if not so significantly. 
The total factor productivity measure used is the “TFP, 1995 = 100” 4. Unfortunately, no data 
on TFP at the industry-level are available for Portugal; therefore, in the estimates considering 
TFP as dependent variable data for Portugal are not included. Looking at the behaviour of our 
variable over time, the mean of TFP in the entire sample is 103.74, whereas the mean from 
1995 (base year = 100) is 104.96, telling us that TFP growth in EU countries in the last years 
has been very scarce. 
The data on employment level were used to construct the actual job reallocation rates, needed 
to obtain our measures of natural rate of job reallocation for each industry. While the estimated 
natural rates of job reallocation (FJR) are contained in a restricted range, the actual job 
                                                          
4 The two productivity measures correspond respectively to the variables LP_I and TFPva_I in EU KLEMS database. 
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reallocation rates are much more changeable (see Annex 3), in line with the idea that actual job 
reallocation rates produce a short rather than a long-run measure of the need of job reallocation. 
The data on capital stock were collected from OECD STAN database, a comprehensive tool for 
analyzing industrial performance across countries. In particular, the capital stock measure used 
is the “CPGK – gross capital stock in volume terms”. Unfortunately, no data on capital stock at 
the industry-level are available for Ireland, Portugal and Sweden; therefore, in the estimates 
including the capital-labour ratio in the productivity equation these countries are dropped. 
The shares of TE at the industry-level were constructed from EU Labour Force Survey, 
launched by the EUROSTAT (see Annex 2 for details)
5
. The mean and standard deviation of 
the share of TE in the sample are respectively 0.12 and 0.10, confirming that TE is an important 
feature of the labour market landscape in Europe by this time, but its importance differs 
significantly across countries. For instance, while in countries as Spain (0.32) and Portugal 
(0.16) the share of TE is far away from the mean, in the UK the mean is no more than 0.06. 
Interestingly, the share of TE turns out to be negatively correlated with labour productivity and 
total factor productivity, both cross-country (     = – 0.2972,       = – 0.3224) and cross-
industry (     = – 0.4836,       = – 0.2481). 
To construct our sector skill intensity index, we divide workers between skilled and unskilled 
using two main indicators. Indeed, the idea initially was to use more than two indicators, to test 
as much as possible our results. However, all other plausible indicators led us to the same 
dichotomy among sectors of those two. For both indicators the data are collected from Science, 
technology and innovation database (made available by the EUROSTAT), which collects data 
from many different publications on these themes as R&D expenditure, workers knowledge, 
HRST, innovations.   
The first indicator concerns the level of education and we consider skilled those workers with a 
tertiary education (level 5 – 6 ISCED 1997). Differently, the second indicator concerns the kind 
of task workers make in their job. In particular, the database gives us these values as a share of 
total employment, for each sector from 2001 to 2007. Indeed, these two indicators lead us to a 
similar, but still slightly different, subdivision of sectors (see Annex 3). 
                                                          
5 The EUROSTAT definition of temporary contracts is the following: “Employees with temporary contracts are those who 
declare themselves as having a fixed term employment contract or a job which will terminate if certain objective criteria are 
met, such as completion of an assignment or return of the employee who was temporarily replaced”. 
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As measure of EPL for PE we made use of the cardinal index constructed by OECD (2004)
6
. In 
our sample from 1992 to 2007 the EPL index for PE ranges from 4.33 in Portugal (1992-2003) 
to 0.95 in the UK (1992-1999). The mean of the index follows a slightly decreasing trend, 
going from 2.47 to 2.33 at the end of the sample. However, the decreasing trend in the 
stringency of regulation of PE is far from being common to all countries, rather it seems to be 
driven by Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, the EPL index for TE
7
 ranges from 5.38 in 
Italy (1992-1996) to 0.25 in the UK (1992-2001). Similarly to PE, the mean of the index for TE 
follows a decreasing trend, going from 2.92 to 1.86. But differently to PE, this decreasing trend 
seems to be a common feature in fairly all EU countries. 
Data on trade union density were collected from ICTWSS database, providing information on 
institutional characteristics of trade unions in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007. In 
particular, the variable used is “the ratio of  wage and salary earners that are trade union 
members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners”. The mean in the sample is 
0.40, telling us how trade union are still an important subject in Europe. However, the standard 
deviation of 0.23 suggests how different is its importance across EU countries. Finally, product 
market regulation indicators used are the OECD Indicators of PMR, a comprehensive set of 
indicators measuring the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition. In our sample 
PMR exhibits much variation, revealing that these policies are not homogenous in Europe. 
A full description of variables and sources can be found in Annex 2, whereas the subdivisions 
of sectors between skilled and unskilled, along with descriptive statistics, are in Annex 3. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy and Skill Intensity Index 
In this section, we show the empirical strategy used in the study to identify the differential 
impact of TE across sectors and, in particular, we describe the method used to divide industries 
between skilled and unskilled sectors. Then, we discuss the main advantages, but also the 
potential drawbacks, of our empirical specification. 
                                                          
6 This index is calculated by scoring different basic items concerning protection of regular workers against individual dismissal 
and, then, converting these scores into a cardinal index from 0 to 6, with a higher index representing a stricter regulation (see 
OECD, Employment Outlook 1999). Therefore, a higher index implies more protection for regular workers against individual 
dismissal. 
7 The procedure to compute the index for temporary workers is fairly the same described in footnote 9. However, the EPL 
index for TE does not measure the degree of protection of temporary workers against individual dismissal, rather it measures 
the restrictions on the use of temporary forms of employment (see OECD, 2004). Therefore, a higher index does not imply 
more protection against individual dismissal, rather it implies stricter conditions for using temporary employment. 
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Our starting point is that the impact of TE on labour productivity might not be homogenous 
across sectors and, in particular, we wonder if the effect differs according to sectors skill 
intensity. To divide industries between skilled sectors (S) and unskilled sectors (US) we 
compute the ratio between skilled and unskilled workers in each sector for different years and, 
then, we consider the mean across time as a general index of sector skill intensity (see e.g., 
Haskel and Slaughter, 2002). Finally, we take the mean of these indexes across sectors and 
consider (un)skilled those sectors with a skill intensity (lower) higher than the average. This 
procedure leads us to the binary indicator SSIIj, which is equal to 1 if j is a skilled sector and 
equal to 0 if j is an unskilled one. As showed below, this indicator SSIIj will be used in the 
productivity equation to disentangle the effect of the share of TE among skilled and unskilled 
sectors. More specifically, the underlying assumption is that the difference between the 
conditional expected total factor productivity (TFP) growth in S and US is some function of the 
share of TE (see Annex 1 for more technical details). 
To make our results easily comparable with previous studies, we estimate also the impact of 
EPL for PE. As standard in this literature, to identify the impact of EPL for PE we follow the 
method introduced in the finance literature by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to evaluate the impact 
of some market regulations, then extended in labour policy evaluation (e.g. Bassanini and 
Venn, 2007, 2008). The main assumption of this approach is that while the degree of market 
regulation is equal for all industries in a country, the impact of it could be different among 
industries, according to some "physiological" (idiosyncratic) characteristics of each sector. 
In the case of labour market regulation, we expect that EPL is more binding in those industries 
characterized by a higher need to reallocate resources
8
. The usual way to specify this different 
binding is to divide industries between binding sectors (B) and non-binding sectors (NB), 
leading to the binary indicator BIj, which is equal to 1 if j is a binding sector and equal to 0 if j 
is a non-binding one (see e.g., Micco and Pages, 2006 and Bassanini et al., 2009). However, 
this specification has not been exempt from criticisms in the literature (see e.g., Ciccone and 
Papaioannou, 2006, Cingano et al., 2010) and, accordingly, in this paper we propend for the 
different specification proposed by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007). The underlying idea is 
the same as the binary indicator, but with an idiosyncratic weight FJRj for each sector 
depurated from labour market frictions and aggregate shocks (see Annex 1 for details). The 
rationale is that some sector might have very specific characteristics requiring more or less job 
                                                          
8 For instance, if firms in a sector need to lay off workers in response to changes in technologies or product demand, a stricter 
EPL could slow the pace of reallocation. By contrast, in industries where changes are less frequent, EPL could be expected to 
have little impact on reallocation and, in turn, on productivity. 
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reallocation than other sectors. Both specifications BIj or FJRj are the usual assumptions 
exploited in the previous literature to identify the impact of the EPL index for both PE and TE. 
However, as discussed in Lisi (2013), while this approach should be appropriate for the 
regulation of PE, the use of the EPL index for TE does not seem to be the appropriate 
independent variable to identify the effect of temporary contracts on labour productivity (see 
also Annex 1 for a technical discussion). Therefore, in our empirical analysis we use the share 
of TE as the main explanatory variable of interest. Indeed, provided that we control for the 
potential endogeneity of TE, this should allow us to capture the effect of the use of temporary 
contracts without passing through the relation between the change in the EPL for TE and actual 
use of temporary contracts in the labour market. 
Then, if we assume a linear relation with TFP growth, we could estimate the impact of TE and 
EPL for PE using both a specification in levels or in growth rates: 
                       
 
   
          
 
   
               
 
   
         
 
   
       
 
   
                                                                                                
                                                                    
                                                                                                                                         
The two specifications presume the same data generating process, in fact specification (3) is the 
first-difference version of specification (2), with              and                   . In 
both specifications   is the differential impact of TE on TFP growth in skilled sectors 
compared to unskilled ones. On the other hand,   represents the impact of TE in unskilled 
sectors and, indeed, its inclusion turns out to be important, since it allows the differential 
impact   to adjust upon a non-zero impact in the control group (US). In addition,   is the 
marginal impact of EPL for PE in a sector with a relative high FJR compared to a sector with a 
relatively low FJR. Finally,      are other independent variables affecting TFP growth such as 
trade union density (TUD), product market regulation (PMR) and time trend (         
        ), whereas μi, δj and φt represent respectively country, industry and time-specific 
fixed effects. Under the exogeneity assumption both fixed-effects (2) and first-difference (3) 
estimating equations produce unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. 
10 
 
However, for efficiency reasons we consider the fixed-effect estimates (2) as more reliable and, 
therefore, as the main source of our interpretation (see Annex 1). 
Following the previous literature, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
constant returns to scale at the industry level: 
              
 
     
   
                                                                                                                   (4) 
where      is total output,      is total factor productivity,      is capital and      is labour. To 
obtain the estimating equation, we divide by     , take the logs and substitute (2) in (4): 
                                 
 
   
          
 
   
               
 
   
 
        
 
   
       
 
   
                                                                      
where      is labour productivity,      is the capital-labour ratio and the remainder is as in (2). 
Finally, to the extent that the level of EPL for regular contracts and the level of temporary 
contracts affect firms decision on investment and, in turn, the level of capital affects labour 
productivity growth, we omit the capital-labour ratio and estimate a reduced form model to 
capture the overall effect on labour productivity growth: 
                       
 
   
          
 
   
               
 
   
         
 
   
       
 
   
                                                                                                
In what follows, even if we report some estimates with the capital-labour ratio as in (5), 
equation (6) represents our baseline specification. 
However, a potential drawback of specification (6) is that it produces consistent estimates 
under the strictly exogeneity of all covariates, which might not be the case in our empirical 
analysis. In particular, to the extent that hiring a temporary worker is a firm’s decision, the 
share of TE might be endogenous in the productivity equation. Therefore, we perform also an 
IV–strategy, using the EPL index for TE as an instrumental variable for the share of TE. In 
particular, the main idea here is that the country legislation concerning the use of temporary 
contracts certainly affect the share of TE in a country, like so the variation of the legislation 
affects the share over time. In this regard, the EPL index for TE turns out to be significantly 
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correlated (p-value = 0.000) with the share of TE in our sample (see also Table A3.4). 
Differently, the legislation about TE should not have any impact on labour productivity but for 
the actual use of temporary contracts; in fact, as long as temporary contracts are not used in the 
labour market, a change in the legislation would be expected to have no impact on labour 
productivity
9
. Moreover, in the following section we provide the results of different statistical 
tests supporting further the use of our instrument. 
Hence, in the first stage we estimate the reduced form equation for the share of TE (7) 
including the EPL index for TE; then, in the second stage we estimate the model for labour 
productivity (8) using the fitted value       as the explanatory variable: 
                     
  
 
   
          
  
 
   
          
     
 
   
      
 
   
      
                                                                                                                                   
                       
 
   
          
 
   
               
 
   
         
 
   
       
 
   
                                                                                                
Our empirical specifications follow previous literature on the topic. However, we introduce a 
crucial difference: instead of identifying an average impact of TE across sectors, here we 
introduce an ulterior assumption with the aim of identifying the differential impact of TE 
according to sectors skill intensity. On the one hand, this should offer a more accurate 
description of the impact of TE; on the other hand, the investigation of this differential impact 
of TE might suggest how temporary contracts are currently used in the labour market (that is, 
least-cost way of screening new workers or cheaper form of job).  
Moreover, while previous papers in this literature use the same identification strategy for the 
two EPL indexes, in this paper we distinguish between EPL for PE and TE. In particular, our 
IV–approach would seem fairly consistent, considering that the EPL index for TE can be 
                                                          
9 As standard in the IV–procedure, while we can easily test for the correlation between instrument and instrumented variable, 
we cannot test for the exogeneity condition of our instrument. Nonetheless, on the one hand, our reasoning on the 
inappropriateness of the direct use of the EPL index for TE as explanatory variable in the labour productivity equation leads us 
to consider fairly reliable also the exogeneity condition of our instrument; on the other hand, in the literature this kind of 
instrument (index measuring the strictness of a national legislation) tend to be considered strictly exogenous because of the 
same reason. For example, OECD (2004) and Bassanini et al. (2009) use as IV exactly the EPL index for TE, and Amable and 
Ledesma (2013) use the product market regulation index as an exogenous instrumental variable. In a previous general article on 
temporary work and labour productivity, we have also used the EPL indicator for TE in IV estimations (Lisi, 2013). 
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considered exogenous in (6) and certainly it is correlated with the share of TE once the other 
exogenous variables have been netted out. In this regard, we will show below different tests 
confirming the goodness of our IV strategy. In our view, this different identification strategy 
for TE, along with our investigation of the differential effect according to sectors skill intensity, 
should allow us to describe more consistently the impact of TE on labour productivity. 
Potential drawbacks of our empirical specification are related to the exogeneity of our 
assumption concerning the differential effect of TE across sectors. In particular, if the use of 
TE changes extensively the skill composition of our sectors and, in turn, the selection of them 
in S and US sectors, then our assumption would not be useful anymore. In fact, in that case we 
are not exploiting the exogenous variation on the impact of the treatment (TE) between control 
group (US) and treatment group (S), because groups themselves are endogenously determined 
by the treatment. Differently, if sectors skill composition and, in turn, control group and 
treatment group are exogenously set by sectors production functions, then our assumption 
should allow us to exploit the exogenous variation on the impact of TE across sectors. 
Indeed, the clear picture emerging from our data is that the correlation between the share of TE 
and sectors skill composition is almost null. In particular, in Figure 1 we report the scatter plot 
between TE and SSI and, as we can see, the cloud would seem to suggest that there is no 
correlation. Moreover, the small and insignificant correlation coefficient (  = – 0.037), as well 
as the insignificant coefficient of SSI in the reduced form equation for TE, also confirm that 
there is no correlation between TE and SSI. Therefore, the different skill composition across 
sectors would seem more driven by the technology underpinning the production function in 
each sector, which leads us to pursue our identification assumption for the differential impact 
of TE on labour productivity. 
 
Fig. 1 Correlation between TE and SSI 
 
4. Estimations Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis. First, we present a 
battery of estimates for the productivity equation, from the simple POLS to the 2SLS with a 
full set of fixed-effects. Then, we present a similar battery for total factor productivity. Finally, 
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we provide some sensitive analysis to check if our findings are robust to little changes in the 
sample used. 
4.1. Labour Productivity 
In Table 1 we report different estimates of the productivity equation, using the first sector skill 
intensity index, that is, the index concerning the level of workers education (see Annex 2 and 
3). In the first column we run a simple POLS regression, including among the explanatory 
variables also the capital–labour ratio. Both point estimates of TE and TE*SSII1 are negative 
and significant at 1%, indicating that TE is even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a 
negative effect significantly heavier than in unskilled sectors. Similarly, the point estimate of 
EPL*FJR is negative and significant, confirming the evidence of previous literature (e.g., 
Cingano et al., 2010). While these estimates are useful to get an insight on the direction of the 
effect, they cannot be interpreted as causal impact, given the omitted variable bias and the 
potential endogeneity of both TE and k in the productivity equation. 
 
Table 1. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (SSII1) 
 
Differently, from the second column on we introduce a large set of fixed-effects (controlling 
for institutional, technological and time differentials in productivity), allowed to be correlated 
with the other explanatory variables. In particular, in the second column are the coefficients 
from equation (5) including k, whereas in the third column we omit k and estimate the reduced 
form model (6) to capture the overall effect on labour productivity. Still, in both specifications 
the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII1 are negative and significant at 1%, so is the coefficient of 
EPL*FRJ. As long as strictly exogeneity holds in (6), the estimated coefficients in column three 
could be interpreted as causal impact of TE on labour productivity growth, differentiated 
according to sectors skill intensity. Notice also that the R-squared values in FE regressions are 
significantly higher than POLS
10
. However, we had already underlined valid reasons for which 
TE might be endogenous in the productivity equation. Therefore, in the next columns we report 
the estimates of our IV-strategy described above. As additional check, we compare also the 
                                                          
10 The extremely high values of R-squared in FE are probably due to the inclusion of the large set of dummies (country, sector 
and time fixed effects) in our FE regressions. Therefore, such high explanatory power should be largely ascribed to fixed 
effects, which indeed we can interpret just as general institutional, technological and time factors driving productivity 
differentials. Nonetheless, their inclusion should help us to alleviate significantly the omitted variable bias and, consequently, 
to isolate the impact of our variables of interest. 
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results for the two standard identification assumptions BIj and FJRj for the EPL index of PE, 
without any sizeable differences in the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII1. 
In columns four and five we show the IV estimates using the EPL index of TE as an instrument 
for TE, without considering the differential effect of TE, along with the result of different tests. 
Interestingly, the results of the endogeneity test tend to confirm that the share of TE is, indeed, 
endogenous in the productivity equation, implying that the estimates of the FE regressions are 
bias and inconsistent (e.g., Lisi, 2013). Likewise, the Kleibergen-Paap weak identification tests 
report significantly high values of F-statistic
11
, implying that the EPL index for TE is, indeed, a 
strong instrument for the share of TE in our IV identification strategy. Nonetheless, even if 
different in magnitude respect to FE, the estimated coefficients of TE are still negative and 
significant. Finally, in the last two columns we include explicitly the differential effect of TE in 
the 2SLS equation (8), using the linear projection of TE. Both point estimates of TE and 
TE*SSII1 are negative and significant, confirming the result that TE is even more damaging in 
skilled sectors respect to unskilled sectors. 
Since we are able to control for several unobserved factors, as well as for the endogeneity of 
the share of TE, we interpret these estimates as causal impact on labour productivity growth 
and, in particular, the coefficient of TE*SSII1 as the differential effect of temporary 
employment on labour productivity between skilled and unskilled sectors. Our central result is 
that TE is even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative effect significantly heavier 
than in unskilled sectors. In particular, an increase of 10 percentage points of the share of TE in 
skilled sectors would lead to a decrease of about 1–1.5% in labour productivity growth, 
whereas in unskilled ones the reduction would be only of 0.5–0.8%. Interestingly, the 
coefficient of TE in column six (or seven) is somewhat lower than the corresponding one in the 
estimation without SSII (column four and/or five); furthermore, notice that the sum of TE and 
TE*SSII1 in column six (or seven) tends to be bigger than the coefficient of TE in the 
estimation without SSII (column four and/or five). Indeed, this suggests that in the estimation 
without SSII we identify the average impact of TE across sectors, whereas with the inclusion of 
the differential effect according to sectors skill intensity we are able to capture a more accurate 
description of the impact of TE. 
                                                          
11 In the case of one endogenous regressor, as in our case, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test reduces to the standard F-statistic 
on the exclusion of the instrument from the first stage. Baum et al. (2007) suggest applying the critical values for the F-statistic 
reported in Stata provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). In particular, if we are willing to accept an actual rejection rate of 10% 
(the lowest tabulated in Stata), the critical value for the F-statistic is 16.38. Therefore, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics of 
59.971 and 59.029 in Table 1 indicate that there is not a problem of weak identification in our IV strategy. 
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To the extent that a subdivision between skilled and unskilled sectors has to be necessarily 
based on a discretional criteria, in Table 2 we repeat the same estimations using our second 
sector skill intensity index, that is, the index concerning the kind of task workers make in their 
job. As said before, this second index leads to a similar, but slightly different, subdivision of 
sectors and, therefore, represents a perfect candidate to test the stability of our findings (see 
Annex 2 and 3). 
 
Table 2. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (SSII2) 
  
Nonetheless, as can be clearly seen from Table 2, this change in the SSII used in the estimation 
does not change at all our conclusions. Still, the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII2 are negative 
and significant at 1%, even with a magnitude very close to the SSII1 estimation. 
4.2. Total Factor Productivity 
The estimated coefficients in Table 1 and 2 represent the overall impacts on labour 
productivity, which is exactly what we aimed to identify. Nonetheless, they do not allow to 
disentangle the overall effect in the production function between total factor productivity and 
capital–labour ratio. Neither the specifications including k allow us to distinguish consistently 
these two effects, since we cannot consider k exogenous in the productivity equation and, in 
turn, the estimated parameters as the true causal impact. However, as long as we are able to 
estimate consistently the impact of our variables of interest on TFP, simple statistical tests on 
the difference of the estimated impact of TE between labour productivity and total factor 
productivity should be able to shed more light on this. 
Therefore, in Table 3 we present different estimates of TFP equation (2), using the first sector 
skill intensity index. In particular, the first column shows the estimates from a simple POLS 
regression, whereas from the second column on we introduce our large set of fixed-effects. In 
both specifications the point estimates of TE and TE*SSII1 are negative and significant, 
confirming also for TFP that TE is even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative 
effect heavier than in unskilled sectors. Similarly, the point estimates of EPL*FJR are negative 
and significant. As long as strictly exogeneity holds in (2), the FE estimated coefficients could 
be interpreted as causal impact of TE on total factor productivity growth, differentiated 
according to sectors skill intensity. However, following the same argument discussed for labour 
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productivity, these estimates cannot be interpreted as causal impact, given the potential 
endogeneity of TE also in the TFP equation. Therefore, in the next columns we perform our 
IV-strategy also for total factor productivity. 
 
Table 3. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (SSII1) 
 
In columns 3 and 4 we show the IV estimates using the EPL index of TE as an instrument for 
TE, without considering the differential effect of TE, along with the result of different tests. 
Notice that also for TFP the endogeneity and weak identification tests tend to confirm the 
goodness of our IV identification strategy. Finally, in the last two columns we include 
explicitly the differential effect of TE in the 2SLS equation, using the linear projection of TE. 
We can see that both point estimates of TE and TE*SSII1 are negative and significant, 
confirming the result that TE is even more damaging in skilled sectors respect to unskilled 
sectors. Since we are able to control for several unobserved factors, as well as for the 
endogeneity of the share of TE, we interpret these estimates as causal impact on total factor 
productivity growth and, in particular, the coefficient of TE*SSII1 as the differential effect of 
temporary employment between skilled and unskilled sectors. 
 
Table 4. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (SSII2) 
 
As we did for labour productivity, in Table 4 we re-estimate all specifications using our second 
sector skill intensity index. Similar to labour productivity, we can see from Table 4 that this 
change in the SSII does not change the results on the impact of our variables of interest on 
TFP. Still, the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII2 are negative and significant, even with a 
magnitude very close to the estimated coefficients using the first skill intensity index. 
As we said above, as long as the impact of our variables of interest are consistently estimated, 
simple statistical tests on the difference of the estimated impact of TE between labour 
productivity and total factor productivity should be able to disentangle the overall effect in the 
production function between total factor productivity and capital–labour ratio. In particular, if 
there is a significant difference between the two estimated impacts, this would imply that TE 
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affects labour productivity not only reducing TFP but also through the impact on capital–labour 
ratio. Differently, if there is no significant difference, then TE would affect labour productivity 
mainly through the impact on TFP. In order to test the null hypothesis                  , 
we perform the following standard z-test on the difference of both regression coefficients of TE 
and TE*SSII (see e.g., Clogg et al., 1995, Brame et al., 1998): 
    
          
             –             
                                                                                                          (9) 
where the numerator is the estimated difference between the coefficients and the denominator 
is the estimated standard deviation of the difference. Under the null    this statistic is 
distributed as a standard normal. Therefore, we compute the value of this Z-statistic for both the 
coefficients of TE and TE*SSII and, then, compare them with the value of the standard normal 
at the 95
th
 quantile, implying a significance level of   = 0.05 for our test. 
 
Table 5. Z-test on the difference of regression coefficients 
 
From Table 5, we can see that fairly all Z-statistics tend to be smaller (in absolute value) than 
the standard normal at the 95
th
 quantile (z = 1.645) and, thus, z-tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis of equality between the coefficients
12
. Indeed, for the coefficient of TE*SSII1 the 
statistic (Z = – 1.671) is barely higher than the standard normal; however, with just a 
significance level of   = 0.047, even for this coefficient the Z-statistic became smaller (in 
absolute value) than the standard normal at the 95.3
th
 quantile (z = 1.675). Therefore, the 
statistical tests performed on the estimated coefficients of TE and TE*SSII reveal that there is 
no significance difference between the impact of our variables of interest on labour 
productivity and total factor productivity. Interestingly, this imply that TE affects labour 
productivity mainly reducing total factor productivity. 
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Finally, to check whether our results depend crucially on the inclusion of some countries in the 
sample or not, we re-estimate the model excluding all countries one-by-one. Therefore, we run 
many FE and 2SLS regressions, where in each regression we exclude one different country. 
                                                          
12 We decided to report the z-test only for the coefficients of 2SLS regressions, since in the paper they are the main source of 
interpretation of our results. Nonetheless, Z-statistics for the coefficients of FE regressions produce exactly the same results.  
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Indeed, this further robustness check should be especially relevant for the issue of temporary 
contracts, since we have already seen in section 2 that the extent of TE is not homogeneous 
across EU countries. In particular, the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in the sample might 
potentially be important in driving our results, as both countries not only have had the highest 
share of temporary contracts for many years, but also they have implemented reforms reducing 
considerably the protection of permanent workers. In Fig. 2 are the coefficients of TE and 
TE*SSII, arranged from the greatest to the smallest, for both FE and 2SLS
13
. 
 
Fig. 2 Coefficients of TE and TE*SSII from the Reduced Sample   
 
As Fig. 2 clearly shows, the results of the estimation do not depend on the sample of countries 
included in the sample. Indeed, both the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII are fairly always 
negative and significant, even omitting Spain and Portugal. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
coefficients would seem to validate sufficiently our result that an increase of 10 percentage 
points of the share of temporary contracts would lead to a decrease of about 1–1.5% in labour 
productivity growth, whereas in unskilled ones the reduction would be only of 0.5–0.8%. 
4.4. General discussion 
Our results appear to be fairly robust and rather stable to the sector skill intensity index and the 
sample of countries used in the analysis. Even omitting Spain and Portugal –the two countries 
with TE shares much above the mean– does not seem particularly crucial for driving our 
results. Provided that we control for several unobserved factors, as well as for the endogeneity 
of the share of TE, we interpret our estimates as causal impact on labour productivity growth 
and, thus, the coefficient of TE*SSII as the differential effect of temporary employment on 
labour productivity between skilled and unskilled sectors. Our main finding is that TE is even 
more damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative effect significantly heavier than in unskilled 
sectors. In particular, an increase of 10 percentage points of the share of TE in skilled sectors 
would lead to a decrease of about 1–1.5% in labour productivity growth, whereas in unskilled 
ones the reduction would be only of 0.5–0.8%.  
Moreover, we have seen that statistical tests on the difference of the impact of TE between 
labour productivity and total factor productivity do not reject the hypothesis of equality, 
                                                          
13 Full regressions are available upon request from the authors. 
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implying that TE affects labour productivity mainly reducing total factor productivity. Apart 
from offering a more accurate description of the impact of TE, our results should represent a 
valid contribution to the previous literature on TE, suggesting how temporary contracts are 
currently used in the labour market. In particular, this evidence should support the idea that TE 
is currently used more as a cheaper form of job, instead of as a least-cost way of screening new 
workers (see e.g., Güell and Petrongolo, 2007).  
Our interpretation is that the reduction in workers’ effort and accumulation of human capital 
induced by the actual way to use TE is more harmful in those sectors where production uses 
skills more intensively. Therefore, rather than considering TE as harmful per se, the main issue 
is how they are used by firms organizing production and how we can preserve an easy entry 
into the labour market improving screening by firms but also retiring incentives to use 
temporary contracts as a mere cheaper way to hire workers. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we have implemented a well-known method in policy evaluation to identify the 
differential impact of TE on labour productivity, according to sectors skill intensity. In 
particular, making use of an industry-level panel of EU countries, we divided industries 
between skilled and unskilled and, then, specified a diff-in-diff style assumption to exploit the 
exogenous source of variation in the impact of TE among different sectors. Moreover, the 
industry-level panel allowed us to control for different unobserved confounding factors, which 
should mitigate significantly the omitted variable and other endogeneity problems. Finally, to 
the extent that the share of TE might be endogenous in the productivity equation, we performed 
also an IV-strategy to test further the identification. Indeed, the empirical analysis on this 
question turns out to be crucial, given that from a theoretical point of view is ambiguous what 
sectors might be more affected by TE. 
The main finding of the paper is that TE is even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a 
negative effect significantly heavier than in unskilled sectors, robust to little changes in the skill 
intensity index and in the sample used. In particular, an increase of 10 percentage points of the 
share of TE in skilled sectors would lead to a decrease of about 1–1.5% in labour productivity 
growth, whereas in unskilled ones the reduction would be only of 0.5–0.8%. Finally, statistical 
tests performed on the estimated coefficients revealed that there is no significance difference 
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between the impact of TE on labour productivity and total factor productivity, implying that TE 
affects labour productivity mainly reducing total factor productivity. 
Apart from offering a more accurate description of the impact of TE, these results could have 
very important policy implications and, certainly, lead us to question if the actual European 
regulation corresponds exactly to the lines of the best practice. In particular, this evidence 
might support the growing feeling that TE is currently used in fairly all industries more as a 
permanent feature much beyond the role as screening device. Consequently, temporary 
contracts seem to be related with permanently high levels of workers’ rotation, damaging all 
sectors but especially skilled sectors, where production uses skills more intensively. 
The main regulatory implication raising from this picture is that the real challenge for labour 
regulation is to find a design to address the use of temporary contracts as a flexible way to enter 
in the market allowing firms to screen new workers towards more stable form of jobs, instead 
of as a structural cheaper form of work. Probably, only in those conditions labour market 
outcomes could be able to benefit from all the advantages in terms of flexibility induced by TE, 
without suffering the secondary consequences on labour productivity. Hence, the future agenda 
of labour market research should certainly include the identification of such kind of regulation. 
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Fig. 1 Correlation between TE and SSI 
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Fig. 2 Coefficients of TE and TE*SSII from the Reduced Sample   
 
       
       
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 1. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (SSII1)           
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
POLS FE FE IV
 b
 IV
 b
 2SLS 
d
 2SLS 
d
 
K/L 
c
 0.011 0.032 
      (0.003)*** (0.010)*** 
EPL 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.005 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
EPL*FJR -0.096 -0.056 -0.092 -0.083 
 
-0.110 
 
 
(0.029)*** (0.035)* (0.039)*** (0.042)** 
 
(0.040)*** 
EPL*BI 
    
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
TE -0.051 -0.049 -0.035 -0.109 -0.109 -0.087 -0.085 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.050)**_ (0.051)** (0.052)* (0.052)* 
TE*SSII1 -0.056 -0.039 -0.046 
  
-0.044 -0.048 
 (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** 
TUD -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.002)*** (0.004)* (0.004)_ (0.004)_ (0.004)_ (0.004)_ (0.004)_ 
PMR -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.001)* (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
TREND 0.002 0.034 0.037 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.037 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)_ (0.002)_ (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
CONSTANT 4.461 
      
  
(0.036)*** 
            
SECTOR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Endogeneity Test 
a
 
   
p-val = 0.02 p-val = 0.02 
 
 
F-statistic 
e 
   
59.971 59.029 
  
Observations 1600 1600 2080 2080 2080 2080 2080 
R-squared 0.2635 0.9993 0.9991 0.9990 0.9990 0.9991 0.9991 
POLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects (dummy variable regression); IV: instrumental variable; 2SLS: two stage least square (second stage); 
K/L: capital-labour ratio; EPL: employment protection legislation; FJR: frictionless job reallocation; BI: binding indicator for EPL; TE: the share of 
temporary employment; SSII1: sector skill intensity index concerning the level of workers education; TUD: trade union density; PMR: product market 
regulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
a The endogeneity test is the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics:  one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments and one for the 
equation with the larger set of instruments. Unlike the Hausman tests, this statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. b First-stage 
estimates reported in Table A3.4. c Data not available for Ireland, Portugal and Sweden.  d Second-stage estimates considering the linear projection of the 
share of temporary employment. e F-statistic of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test for weak identification.     
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Table 2. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (SSII2)       
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
POLS FE FE 2SLS 
d
 2SLS 
d
 
K/L 
c
 0.015 0.035 
    (0.003)*** (0.010)*** 
EPL 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.005 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
EPL*FJR -0.105 -0.049 -0.089 -0.095 
 
 
(0.029)*** (0.030)* (0.039)*** (0.028)*** 
EPL*BI 
    
-0.002 
 (0.000)*** 
TE -0.052 -0.052 -0.039 -0.099 -0.103 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** 
TE*SSII2 -0.051 -0.031 -0.041 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)** (0.010)* 
TUD -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.003)_ (0.003)_ (0.003)_ 
PMR -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.001)* (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
TREND 0.002 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.038 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
CONSTANT 4.412 
    
  
(0.036)*** 
        
SECTOR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1600 1600 2080 2080 2080 
R-squared 0.2581 0.9993 0.9991 0.9991 0.9991 
POLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects (dummy variable regression); 2SLS: two stage least square (second stage); K/L: capital-
labour ratio; EPL: employment protection legislation; FJR: frictionless job reallocation; BI: binding indicator for EPL; TE: the share of temporary 
employment; SSII2: sector skill intensity index concerning the kind of task workers make in their job; TUD: trade union density; PMR: product 
market regulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
c Data not available for Ireland, Portugal and Sweden. d Second-stage estimates considering the linear projection of the share of temporary 
employment. 
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Table 3. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY c (SSII1)       
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
POLS FE IV IV 2SLS 
d
 2SLS 
d
 
EPL 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.007 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
EPL*FJR -0.043 -0.097 -0.108 
 
-0.111 
  (0.019)*** (0.031)*** (0.033)***  (0.032)*** 
EPL*BI 
   
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
    (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
TE -0.056 -0.035 -0.099 -0.099 -0.112 -0.141 
 (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.038)*** (0.037)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)*** 
TE*SSII1 -0.021 -0.016 
  
-0.018 -0.013 
 (0.007)*** (0.008)** (0.011)* (0.010)_ 
TUD -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002)* (0.003)_ (0.003)_ (0.004)_ (0.004)_ (0.004)_ 
PMR -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001)* (0.002)** (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)_ (0.002)_ 
TREND 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.001 0.035 0.034 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)_ (0.001)_ (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
CONSTANT 4.595 
     
  (0.006)***           
SECTOR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Endogeneity Test 
a
 
  
p-val = 0.10 p-val = 0.09 
  
F-statistic 
e 
  
71.132 70.005 
  
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 
R-squared 0.1171 0.9993 0.9993 0.9993 0.9993 0.9993 
POLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects (dummy variable regression); IV: instrumental variable; 2SLS: two stage least square 
(second stage); EPL: employment protection legislation; FJR: frictionless job reallocation; TE: the share of temporary employment; SSII1: 
sector skill intensity index concerning the level of workers education; TUD: trade union density; PMR: product market regulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
a The endogeneity test is the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics:  one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments and one for 
the equation with the larger set of instruments. Unlike the Hausman tests, this statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. c 
Data not available for Portugal.d Second-stage estimates considering the linear projection of the share of temporary employment. e F-statistic 
of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test for weak identification. 
 
 
28 
 
Table 4. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY c (SSII2)     
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
POLS FE 2SLS 
d
 2SLS 
d
 
EPL 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.007 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
EPL*FJR -0.051 -0.105 -0.109 
  (0.019)*** (0.031)*** (0.028)*** 
EPL*BI 
   
-0.002 
    (0.001)*** 
TE -0.053 -0.034 -0.113 -0.150 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** 
TE*SSII2 -0.034 -0.030 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)* (0.010)_ 
TUD -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002)** (0.003)_ (0.003)_ (0.003)_ 
PMR -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001)* (0.002)** (0.002)_ (0.002)_ 
TREND 0.001 0.034 0.034 0.036 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
CONSTANT 4.595 
   
  (0.006)***       
SECTOR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES 
COUNTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES YES 
YEAR DUMMIES NO YES YES YES 
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920 
R-squared 0.1260 0.9993 0.9993 0.9993 
POLS: pooled ordinary least squares; FE: fixed effects (dummy variable regression); 2SLS: two stage least square (second stage); EPL: 
employment protection legislation; FJR: frictionless job reallocation; TE: the share of temporary employment; SSII2: sector skill 
intensity index concerning the kind of task workers make in their job ; TUD: trade union density; PMR: product market regulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
c Data not available for Portugal. d Second-stage estimates considering the linear projection of the share of temporary employment. 
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Table 5. Z-test on the difference of regression coefficients 
Estimate 2SLS LP (SSII1) TFP (SSII1) Z-statistic Standard normal 
TE  -0.087 -0.112 
0.356 1.645 
s.e. (  ) 0.052 0.047 
TE*SSII1 -0.044 -0.018 
-1.671 1.645 
s.e. (  ) 0.011 0.011 
 LP (SSII2) TFP (SSII2)   
TE  -0.099 -0.113 
0.243 1.645 
s.e. (  ) 0.043 0.038 
TE*SSII2 -0.021 -0.014 
-0.492 1.645 
s.e. (  ) 0.011 0.009 
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ANNEX 1: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
 
Identification assumption on the differential effect of TE 
The main inspiration of the paper is that the impact of TE on labour productivity might not be 
homogenous across sectors and, in particular, we wonder if this effect differs according to 
sectors skill intensity. More specifically, dividing industries between skilled sectors (S) and 
unskilled sectors (US), we specify the following diff-in-diff style assumption with continuous 
treatment, according to which the difference between the conditional expected total factor 
productivity growth in the control group US and in the treatment group S is some function of 
the share of TE: 
       
  
 
         
  
  
                                                                                       (A1.1) 
where the first element indicates the conditional expected TFP growth in the treatment group S 
in country i at time t, the second one the same for the control group US and TE is the share of 
TE in country i in sector j at time t. In particular, the TFP growth in (A1.1) are conditional in 
the sense that our assumption is valid after that all the other explanatory variables affecting 
TFP growth have been netted out; on the other hand, TFP growth are expected in the sense that 
in (A1.1) they are the average across all sectors within the two groups. Finally, notice that with 
respect to the standard diff-in-diff assumption where only observations in the treatment group 
are treated, in our case we assume that is the impact of the treatment to be different between the 
two groups. To this extent, our assumption is very close to the spirit of the method introduced 
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to evaluate the impact of some market regulations. 
 
Sector Skill Intensity Index 
To divide industries between skilled sectors (S) and unskilled sectors (US) we compute the 
ratio between skilled (SW) and unskilled workers (USW) in each sector for different years and, 
then, we consider the mean across time as a general index of sector skill intensity (see e.g., 
Haskel and Slaughter, 2002): 
       
 
 
   
  
   
 
  
 
           for each                                                                       (A1.2) 
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Finally, we take the mean of these indexes across sectors and consider (un)skilled those sectors 
with a skill intensity (lower)higher than the average. This procedure leads us to the binary 
indicator SSIIj, which is equal to 1 if j is a skilled sector and equal to 0 if j is an unskilled one: 
         
                     
 
 
      
 
    
                     
 
 
      
 
    
                 for each                                   (A1.3) 
 
Identification assumption on the impact of EPL for PE 
As standard in this literature, the empirical strategy to identify the impact of EPL for PE 
follows the method introduced in the finance literature by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to 
evaluate the impact of some market regulations, then extended in labour policy evaluation (e.g. 
Bassanini and Venn, 2007, 2008). The main assumption of this approach is that while the 
degree of market regulation is equal for all industries in a given country, the impact of it could 
be different among industries, according to some "physiological" characteristics of each sector. 
The usual way to specify this different binding assumption is dividing industries in binding 
sectors (B) and non-binding sectors (NB) and specifying the following diff-in-diff style 
assumption with continuous treatment, according to which the difference between the 
conditional expected TPF growth in the control group NB and in the treatment group B is some 
function of the degree of market regulation EPL:  
       
  
 
         
  
  
                                                                                     (A1.4) 
where the first element indicates the conditional expected TFP growth in the treatment group B 
in country i at time t, the second one the same for the control group NB and EPL is the degree 
of regulation in country i at time t (see e.g., Micco and Pages, 2006 and Bassanini et al., 2009). 
Again, the TFP growth in (A1.4) are conditional in the sense that the assumption is valid after 
that all the other explanatory variables affecting TFP growth have been netted out; on the other 
hand, TFP growth are expected in the sense that in (A1.4) they are the average across all sectors 
within the two groups. Finally, with respect to the standard diff-in-diff assumption where only 
observations in the treatment group are treated, in this case is the impact of the treatment 
assumed to be different between the two groups. 
As far as EPL studies are concerned, the main problem is to recover an appropriate measure of 
the natural need of job reallocation in each industry to divide sectors. In fact, since the actual 
turnover rates are themselves affected by EPL, they should not be used as a reliable index for 
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the natural need of job reallocation. The method proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to deal 
with this problem is to use data from a frictionless country as a proxy for the physiological 
characteristics of each industry. Following this idea, a standard approach to classify industries 
in EPL studies is to use turnover rates in the US, usually considered the quintessential 
frictionless country (Micco and Pagés, 2006, Bassanini et al., 2009).  
However, this specification has not been exempt from criticisms in the literature and, 
accordingly, in the paper we propend for the following identification assumption (see e.g. 
Cingano et al., 2010): 
       
   
         
   
                                                                       (A1.5)  
where the first element indicates the conditional expected TFP growth in sector j in country i at 
time t, the second one the same in sector k and FJR represent the frictionless job reallocation 
rate. More specifically, this assumption states that the difference between the conditional 
expected TFP growth in two sectors j and k, in country i at time t, is a function of the degree of 
regulation weighted with the natural need of job reallocation of those sectors. Therefore, the 
underlying idea is the same as (A1.4), but in (A1.5) we specify the different binding with an 
idiosyncratic weight FJR for each sector. 
 
Frictionless Job Reallocation 
To obtain our FJR we follow the method proposed by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006, 2007) 
to obtain a measure of "physiological" rate of job reallocation in each industry, depurated from 
the frictions introduced by labour market regulation and the effect of aggregate shocks. In 
particular, we regress the actual job reallocation rate at industry level on industry dummies   , 
industry dummies interacted with the EPL index          and country-time dummies    : 
                                                                                                               (A1.6) 
The presence of country-time dummies     should control for any time-varying differences 
across countries, whereas the interaction term          should absorb the effect of market 
regulation on job reallocation rate, allowing us to obtain an appropriate estimate      =     of 
natural rate of job reallocation in each industry. Specifically, the job reallocation rate in (A1.6) 
are defined following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Cingano et al. (2010), that is: 
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                                                                                                           (A1.7) 
where      is the level of employment in industry j, in country i, at time t. 
 
Empirical strategy for TE (EPL for TE vs. the share of TE) 
The different binding assumption is the usual empirical strategy implemented in the previous 
literature to identify the impact of the EPL index for both PE and TE. However, as discussed in 
Lisi (2013), while this approach should be appropriate for the regulation of PE, the use of the 
EPL index for TE does not seem to be the appropriate independent variable to identify the 
effect of temporary contracts on labour productivity. The EPL index for regular contracts 
expresses the degree of layoff protection for permanent workers. Thus, it certainly influences 
firms and workers behaviour on investment and effort, affecting directly labour productivity. 
Differently, the EPL index for temporary contracts does not express the degree of layoff 
protection, rather the permissiveness to use temporary contracts. Therefore, the legislation on 
TE influences labour productivity only to the extent firms actually use temporary contracts. 
Evidently, the EPL index affects the use of TE by firms, but it is certainly difficult to establish 
what is the relation between the timing of a reform introducing (or facilitating) the use of 
temporary contracts and their actual use and expansion in the labour market. Thus, provided 
that we check for the potential endogeneity of TE, it would seem more appropriate to use 
directly the variation in the share of TE, rather than the EPL index for temporary contracts. In 
this way we should be able to isolate the impact of TE on labour productivity growth, without 
passing through the relation between the change in the EPL for TE and actual use of temporary 
contracts in the labour market. Moreover, using the share of TE as covariate instead of the EPL 
index for TE, we do not need to rely on some assumption concerning how much the EPL index 
is binding in different industries. 
 
Fixed-effects vs. First-difference 
Under the exogeneity assumption                                       both fixed-effects 
(2) and first-difference (3) estimating equations produce unbiased and consistent estimates of 
the parameters of interest, therefore the choice between them concerns exclusively the 
efficiency of the estimation. In particular, it is well-known that the fixed-effects estimator is the 
34 
 
most efficient estimator under the assumption of idiosyncratic errors      serially uncorrelated; 
on the other hand, the first-difference estimator is more efficient when      follows a random 
walk, which means that there is very substantial serial correlation. In this regard, with T large 
and N not so large and especially if one is dealing with unit root processes, first-difference 
estimator has the advantage of ruling out the unit root, implying that one can still appeal to the 
central limit theorem even with T larger than N. Differently, when N is consistently larger than 
T, the serial correlation of the error term should not represent a big problem. Moreover, if the 
strict exogeneity assumption is somehow violated, event we investigate below in the paper, 
fixed-effects estimator is likely to exhibit substantially less bias than first-difference 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Hence, in our case with N = 130 and T = 16, there might be a scope for 
choosing fixed-effects for the greater efficiency, provided that one includes in the estimation 
the time trend and the variance estimator robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. In 
addition, regardless of the theoretical assumption on the idiosyncratic error term, in cases 
where the explanatory variables do not exhibit a sufficient amount of variation in both 
dimensions (time and cross-section) the first-difference transformation might further reduce 
their variation and, thus, the first-difference estimator might in practice produce estimates with 
very little precision. For all these reasons, in this paper we consider the fixed-effect estimates 
as more reliable and, therefore, as the main source of our interpretation. 
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ANNEX 2: DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Labour Productivity 
Definition: gross value added in volume terms (base 1995 = 100) divided by total hours worked  
(variable LP_I in EU KLEMS database). 
 
       
         
            
      
 
Source: EU KLEMS database. 
 
A potential disadvantage of using an index measure with value added in volumes is that it 
limits the comparability in productivity levels among countries and industries. Nonetheless, in 
our econometric analysis we are interested in exploiting the variation in productivity growth, 
which indeed is entirely exploited using our measure (1). In fact, the index measure (1) leads to 
a labour productivity growth as that produced by the unit measure of value added 
 
            
    
   
           
            
      
         
            
     
         
            
    
   
   
            
                         
         
            
    
   
                      
         
  
  
which is entirely comparable among countries and industries. Furthermore, the productivity 
measure (1) has the advantage of being neutral to any difference in price dynamics between 
countries and industries. Finally, this index measure is the productivity measure largely most 
used in the literature (e.g. OECD, 2007, Bassanini et al., 2009), with the considerable 
advantage of making our study more comparable to previous results in the literature.  
 
Total Hours Worked 
Definition: product of average hours worked and total person engaged. 
 
Source: EU KLEMS database. 
 
Total Factor Productivity 
Definition: total factor productivity (base 1995 = 100) 
(variable TFPva_I in EU KLEMS database). 
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Source: EU KLEMS database. 
 
Employment Level 
Definition: total persons engaged.  
 
Source: EU KLEMS database. 
 
Job Reallocation Rate 
Definition: Davis and Haltiwanger measure of job reallocation rate         
              
                
 . 
 
Source: own calculation from the employment level data from EU KLEMS database. 
 
Frictionless Job Reallocation Rate (    ) 
Definition: job reallocation rate depurated from the frictions introduced by labour market 
regulation and the effect of aggregate shocks. 
 
Source: own estimation. 
 
Capital Stock 
Definition: gross capital stock in volume terms  
(variable CPGK in OECD STAN database). 
 
Source: OECD STAN database. 
 
Share of Temporary Employment 
Definition: the share of persons engaged with temporary contracts over total person engaged. A 
job may be considered temporary if employer and employee agree that its end is determined by 
objective conditions such as a specific date, the completion of a task or the return of another 
employee who has been temporarily replaced. The following belong to these categories: 
 Persons with fixed-term contracts (FTC); 
 Persons engaged by an agency (TWA) and hired to a third party to perform a specific 
task (unless there is a written work contract of unlimited duration with the agency); 
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 Persons with seasonal employment; 
 Persons with specific training contracts (if there are no objective criteria for the end of a 
job or work contract, this should be considered permanent or of unlimited duration); 
 Persons on probationary period. 
 
Source: EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey. 
 
For an object so heterogeneous like TE perfect comparability among countries is difficult to 
achieve, even by means of a single survey carried out at the same time, using the same 
questionnaire and a single method of recording. Nonetheless, the degree of comparability of the 
LFS is considerably higher than that of any other existing set of statistics on employment 
available for countries in our sample. Given these institutional discrepancies, the LFS concept 
of TE describes situations which, in different institutional contexts, can be considered similar. 
 
SSII1 – 2 
Definition: binary indicators equal to 1 for skilled sectors and equal to 0 for unskilled ones. 
Indicator 1 concerns the workers’ level of education, 2 the task workers made in their job. 
 
Source: own calculation. 
 
Share of skilled workers in SSII1 
Definition: share of workers with a tertiary education (level 5 – 6 ISCED 1997). 
 
Source: EUROSTAT Science, technology and innovation database. 
 
Share of skilled workers in SSII2 
Definition: share of workers occupied in science and technology tasks (HRST). 
 
Source: EUROSTAT Science, technology and innovation database. 
 
EPL for Permanent Employment 
Definition: OECD index of employment protection legislation on regular contracts. 
 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2004). 
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EPL for Temporary Employment 
Definition: OECD index of the permissiveness on the use of temporary contracts. 
 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2004). 
 
Trade Union Density 
Definition: employees trade union members divided by total number of employees. 
 
Source: ICTWSS database. 
 
Product Market Regulation 
Definition: OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation, a comprehensive set of indicators 
measuring the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition in areas of the product 
market where competition is viable. The indicators cover formal regulations in the following 
areas: state control of business enterprises; legal and administrative barriers to 
entrepreneurship; barriers to international trade and investment. 
 
Source: OECD database. 
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ANNEX 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
 
TABLE A3.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labour Productivity 2080 110.936 24.237 63.486 286.575 
Log Labour Productivity 2080 4.689 0.192 4.151 5.658 
Total Factor Productivity 1920 103.742 15.522 61.629 199.388 
Log Total Factor Productivity 1920 4.632 0.141 4.121 5.295 
Capital-Labour ratio 1600 754330.1 2222605 11961.45 23719022 
Log Capital-Labour ratio 1600 12.324 1.376 9.389 16.982 
Job Reallocation 1950 0.027 0.026 0.000 0.239 
Frictionless Job Reallocation 2080 0.043 0.009 0.028 0.059 
Share of TE 2080 0.118 0.103 0.000 0.694 
EPL for Regular Contracts 2080 2.376 0.826 0.948 4.333 
EPL for Temporary Contracts 2080 2.189 1.255 0.250 5.375 
Trade Union Density 2080 0.402 0.229 0.076 0.839 
Product Market Regulation 2080 1.696 0.481 0.771 2.528 
Sector Skill Intensity 1 910 0.082 0.049 0.016 0.156 
Sector Skill Intensity 2 520 0.217 0.152 0.034 0.518 
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TABLE A3.2 INDUSTRY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Industry                      
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 0.2048 117.1452 113.3016 0.049 
Total Manufacturing 0.0891 119.5393 107.4631 0.038 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0.0631 126.7167 110.3447 0.059 
Construction 0.1400 100.1263 97.8735 0.045 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.1046 110.8905 104.1041 0.028 
Hotels and Resturants 0.1761 100.0441 97.1390 0.040 
Transport, Storage and Communication  0.0827 117.4543 108.4009 0.036 
Financial Intermediation 0.0633 120.8515 106.3441 0.039 
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 0.0932 96.2325 97.1183 0.057 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services 0.1679 100.3553 95.3268 0.040 
 
              
 
   1 -0.4836 -0.2481  
       -0.4836 1 0.9130  
 
     -0.2481 0.9130 1  
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TABLE A3.3 COUNTRY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Country                 
Austria 0.0631 109.6844 106.0690 
Belgium 0.0545 108.1211 101.0587 
Denmark 0.0936 105.5621 98.1947 
Finland 0.1289 112.1675 108.3581 
France 0.1245 112.1939 106.8663 
Germany 0.1164 110.7430 107.3981 
Ireland 0.0626 119.8140 106.7250 
Italy 0.1079 102.9484 98.2979 
Netherlands 0.1374 111.0894 103.6141 
Portugal 0.1624 116.6231 103.7416 
Spain 0.3241 105.3882 98.8157 
Sweden 0.1061 112.1912 104.4574 
United Kingdom 0.0588 115.6359 105.0443 
 
             
 
   1 -0.2972 -0.3224 
       -0.2972 1 0.7256 
 
     -0.3224 0.7256 1 
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Table A3.4 SHARE OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT (FIRST-STAGE IV)  
  
(1) (2) 
  
FS FS 
EPL for TE -0.026 -0.026 
 
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
EPL for PE 0.035 0.026 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
EPL*FJR -0.245 
 
 
(0.065)*** 
 
EPL*BI 
 
-0.003 
  
(0.001)** 
TUD -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.010)* (0.010)* 
PMR -0.045 -0.045 
 (0.009)*** (0.010)*** 
TREND 0.007 0.008 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
SECTOR DUMMIES YES YES 
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES 
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES 
   
Observations 2080 2080 
R-squared 0.8584 0.8579 
FS: first-stage estimates of the IV regression; EPL for TE: employment protection legislation for temporary employment; 
EPL for PE: employment protection legislation for permanent employment; FJR: frictionless job reallocation; BI: binding 
indicator for EPL for PE; TUD: trade union density; PMR: product market regulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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SKILLED AND UNSKILLED SECTORS PRODUCED BY “SSII1” 
SKILLED SECTORS UNSKILLED SECTORS 
Manufacturing Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
  
 Wholesale and retail trade  Electricity, gas and water supply 
  
 Hotels and restaurants Construction  
  
 Financial intermediation Transport, storage and communication 
  
 Real estate, renting and business activities Other community, social and personal services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SKILLED AND UNSKILLED SECTORS PRODUCED BY “SSII2” 
SKILLED SECTORS UNSKILLED SECTORS 
Manufacturing Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
  
 Wholesale and retail trade  Electricity, gas and water supply 
  
 Financial intermediation Construction  
  
 Real estate, renting and business activities Hotels and restaurants 
  
 Other community, social and personal services Transport, storage and communication 
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EPL BINDING AND NON-BINDING SECTORS PRODUCED BY “BI” 
BINDING SECTORS NON-BINDING SECTORS 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry Electricity, gas and water supply 
  Manufacturing Construction 
  Transport, storage and communication Wholesale and retail trade 
  Real estate, renting and business activities Hotels and restaurants 
  Other community, social and personal services Financial intermediation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
